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Standfirst
Social and behavioural scientists have attempted to speak to the COVID-19 crisis. But 
is behavioural research on COVID-19 suitable for making policy decisions? We offer a 
taxonomy that lets our science advance in Evidence Readiness Levels to be suitable for 
policy. We caution practitioners to take extreme care translating our findings to 
applications.
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Researchers in the social and behavioural sciences periodically debate 
whether their research should be used to address pressing issues in society. To provide 
a few examples, in the 1940s psychologists discussed using research to address 
problems related to intergroup relations, problems brought to the fore by the Holocaust 
and other acts of rampant prejudice. In the 1990s, psychologists debated whether their 
research should inform legal decision-making. In the 2010s, psychologists argued for 
advising branches of government as economists often do. And now, in 2020, 
psychologists and other social and behavioural scientists are arguing that our research 
should inform the response to the new coronavirus disease (henceforth COVID-19)1,2. 
We are a team mostly consisting of empirical psychologists who conduct 
research on basic, applied, and meta-scientific processes. We believe that scientists 
should apply their creativity, efforts, and talents to serve our society, especially during 
crises. However, the way that social and behavioural science research is often 
conducted makes it difficult to know whether our efforts will do more good than harm. 
We will provide some examples from the field of social-personality psychology, where 
most of us were trained, to illustrate our concerns. This focus is not meant to imply our 
field alone suffers from the issues we will discuss. Instead, a growing meta-science 
literature suggests that many other social and behavioural disciplines have encountered 
similar dynamics as our field. 
What are those dynamics? First, study samples, mainly students, are drawn from 
populations that are in Western (mostly US), Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic societies3. Second, even with this narrow slice of population, the effects in 
published papers are not estimated with precision, sometimes barely ruling out trivially 
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small effects under ostensibly controlled conditions. Third, many studies use a narrow 
range of stimuli and do not test for stimulus generalisability4. Fourth, many studies 
examine effects on measures, such as self-report scales, that are infrequently validated 
or linked to behaviour, much less policy relevant outcomes5. Fifth, independently 
replicated findings, even under ideal circumstances, are rare. Finally, our studies often 
fail to account for deeper cultural, historical, political, and structural factors that play 
important moderating roles during the process of translation from basic findings to 
application. Together, these issues produce empirical insights that are more 
heterogeneous than might be apparent from a scan of the published literature. 
Confident applications of social and behavioural science findings, then, require 
first and foremost an assessment of the evidence quality and weighing heterogeneity 
and the tradeoffs and opportunity costs that follow. We must identify reliable findings 
that can be applied, have been investigated in the world’s nations where the application 
is intended for, and are derived from investigations using diverse stimuli. But the 
assessment of how “ready” the intervention is must be included when persuading 
decision-makers to apply social and behavioural science evidence, particularly in crisis 
situations when lives are at stake and resources are limited. Not doing so can have 
disastrous consequences.   
Here we propose one approach for assessing the quality of evidence prior to 
application and dissemination. Specifically, we draw inspiration from the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Technology Readiness Levels (TRL6), a 
benchmarking system for systematically evaluating the quality of scientific evidence and 
which has been utilized by the European Commission to judge how ready scientific 
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applications beyond space flight are for operational environments. TRLs rank a 
technology’s readiness for application from 1 to 9 (see Figure 1). At TRL1, basic 
principles have been reliably observed, reported, and translated to a formal model. In 
TRL2, basic principles have been developed and tested in an application area. It is not 
until TRL4, when a prototype is developed, that tests are run in various environments 
that are as representative of the eventual application area(s) as possible. Later at TRL6, 
the system is tested in a “real” environment (like ground-to-space). At the very highest 
level (TRL9), the system has been “flight-proven” through successful mission 
operations. These TRLs provide a useful framework to jumpstart conversations about 
how to assess the readiness of social and behavioural science evidence for application 
and dissemination. 
Introducing Evidence Readiness Levels
The desire to “directly inform policy and individual and collective behaviour in 
response to the pandemic” (p. 461)1 overlooks existing evidence frameworks and the 
challenges we identify, illustrating that a simple taxonomy is necessary to have at hand 
during crises. As a very preliminary step to this end we propose a social and 
behavioural science variant of TRLs, Evidence Readiness Levels (ERLs; Figure 2). 
There are several frameworks for assessing evidence quality across different 
scientific fields. The one that comes closest to what we envision is the Society for 
Prevention standards for prevention interventions7, as it incorporates standards for 
efficacy and dissemination and feedback loops from crisis to theory. However, none of 
the existing frameworks capture the meta-scientific insights generated in our field in the 
last decade.
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Our ERLs do not map perfectly onto NASA’s TRLs and we should not expect 
them to; there are many differences between behavioural and rocket science. In the 
social and behavioural sciences we think this process should start with defining 
problem(s) in collaboration with the stakeholders most likely to implement the 
interventions (ERL1). These concepts can then be further developed in consultation 
with people in the target settings to gather preliminary information about how settings or 
context might alter processes (ERL2). From there, researchers can conduct systematic 
reviews and other meta-syntheses to select evidence that could potentially be applied 
(ERL3). These systematic reviews require a number of bias-detection techniques. It is 
well-known that the behavioural sciences suffer from publication bias and other 
practices that compromise the integrity of research evidence. Some findings may be 
reliable, but the onus is on us to identify which are and which are not and which 
generalize or not. Yet, still then, these systematic reviews must be done with an 
awareness that the currently available statistical techniques do not completely correct 
for bias and that the resultant findings are at most at ERL3. 
Following this, one can gather information about stimulus and measurement 
validity and equivalence for application in the target setting (ERL4). After, researchers - 
in consultation with local experts - should consider the potential benefits and harms 
associated with applying potential solutions (ERL5), and generate estimates of effects in 
a pilot sample (ERL6). With preliminary effects in hand, the team can then begin to test 
for heterogeneity in low-stakes (ERL7) and higher-stakes (ERL8) samples and settings 
which would build the confidence necessary to apply the findings in the real target 
setting or crisis situation (ERL9). 
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Even at ERL9, evidence evaluation continues; applications of social and 
behavioural work, particularly in a crisis, should be iterative so high-quality evidence is 
fed back to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention, critical and flexible 
improvements. Feedback should be grounded in collaboration between basic and 
applied researchers, as well as with stakeholders to ensure that the resulting evidence 
is relevant and actionable. Failure to continually re-evaluate interventions in light of new 
data could lead to unnecessary harm, where even the best evidence was inadequate to 
predict the intervention's real-world effects.
A benchmarking system such as the ERL requires us to think carefully about the 
nature of our research that can be applied credibly and guides where research 
investments should be made. For example, we can better recognise that our goal of 
gathering reliable insights (ERL3) provides a necessary foundation for further collective 
efforts that scaffold towards scalable and generalisable interventions (ERL7). 
Community experts, identifying relevant theories, and extensive observations are key to 
framing challenges and working with interdisciplinary teams to address them (ERL1). 
Behavioural scientists from different cultures then discuss how interventions may need 
to differ in nature across context and cultures. The multidisciplinary and multi-
stakeholder nature of ERLs require us to fundamentally rethink how we produce, and 
communicate confidence in, application-ready findings.
The current crisis provides a chance for social and behavioural scientists to 
question how we understand and communicate the value of our scientific models in 
terms of ERLs. It also requires us to communicate those ERLs to policy-makers so that 
they know whether we are making educated guesses (ERL3 or below) or can be 
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confident about the application of our findings because we have tested and replicated 
them in representative environments (ERL7). When providing policy advice on the basis 
of scientific evidence, it is important to understand and be able to explain whether and 
how recommendations would impact relevant people under a range of circumstances 
that are highly relevant to the crisis in question (ERL7).
Even if findings are at ERL3 after having assessed evidence quality of primary 
studies, we have little way of knowing how much positive, or unintended negative, 
consequences an intervention might have when applied to a new situation. We are 
concerned to see social and behavioural scientists making confident claims about the 
utility of scientific findings for solving COVID-19 problems without regard for whether 
those findings are based on the kind of scientific methods that would move them up the 
ERL ladder1. The absence of recognised benchmarking systems makes this 
challenging. While it is tempting to instead qualify uncertainty by using non-committal 
language about the possible utility of existing findings (e.g., “may”, “could”), this 
approach is fundamentally flawed because public conversations generally ignore these 
rhetorical caveats8. Scientists should actively communicate uncertainty, particularly 
when speaking to crises. Communicating that their ERL is only at 3 or 4 would empower 
policy makers how to weigh our advice in terms of their options. Reaching a higher ERL 
is extremely complicated and will require radical changes in the way we conduct 
research, also beyond crises. 
How Social and Behavioural Scientists Can Advance their ERLs 
The field of genetics started in a position similar to the position that many 
behavioural sciences find themselves in now with small, independently collected 
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samples that produced unreliable findings. Attempts to identify candidate genes for 
many constructs of interest kept stalling at TRL1/ERL4. In one prominent example, 52 
patients provided genetic material for an analysis of the relationship between the 5-HTT 
gene and major depression9, a finding that spurred enormous interest in the biological 
mechanisms underlying depression. Unfortunately, as with the current situation in 
psychology, these early results were contradicted by failed replication studies10. 
Technological advances in genotyping unlocked different approaches for 
geneticists. Instead of working in isolated teams, geneticists pooled resources via 
consortium studies and thereby accelerated scientific progress and quality. Their recent 
studies (with samples that sometimes exceed 1,000,000) dwarf previous candidate 
gene studies in terms of sample size11. To accomplish this, geneticists devoted 
considerable time to developing research workflows, data harmonization systems, and 
processes that increased the accuracy of their measurements. The new methodologies 
are not without flaws: for example, there is substantial scope for expanding the 
representativeness of study cohorts. But the progress that consortium research in 
genetics has made in a short time is impressive. 
In recent years we have observed similar progress in the psychological sciences 
going from single, small-sample studies to large-scale replications12,13 and novel 
studies14 to the building of the prerequisite infrastructure to facilitate team science. One 
example is the Psychological Science Accelerator (PSA), a large, standing network with 
experts facilitating study selection, data management, ethics, and translation15. While 
the PSA is making important progress, problems surrounding measurement validity, 
sample generalizability, and organizational diversity (40% of its leadership is from North 
9
America) which affects the networks ability to accurately interpret findings, still present 
material challenges to the applicability of their projects. Therefore, the PSA will require 
substantial improvement and investment before it can generate practical ERL7-level 
evidence and further develop our proposed framework. 
The COVID-19 crisis underscores the critical need to bring the social and 
behavioural sciences in line with other mature sciences. Diverse consortia of 
researchers with expertise in philosophy, ethics, statistics, and data and code 
management are needed to produce the kind of research required to better understand 
people the world over. Realising this mature, inclusive, and efficient model necessitates 
a shift in the knowledge production and evaluation models that guide the social and 
behavioural sciences. 
 Be cautious when applying social and behavioural science to policy
On balance, we hold the view that the social and behavioural sciences have the 
potential to help us better understand our world. However, we are less sanguine about 
whether many areas of social and behavioural sciences are mature enough to provide 
such understanding, particularly when considering life-and-death issues like a 
pandemic. We believe that, rather than appealing to policy-makers to recognise our 
value, we should focus on earning the credibility that legitimates a seat at the policy 
table. The ERL taxonomy is a sample roadmap for achieving this level of maturity as a 
science, and for accurately and honestly communicating our current state of evidence. 
Collaborations among large and diverse teams with local knowledge and multi-
disciplinary expertise can help us move up the evidence ladder. Equally important, 
studies in the behavioural sciences must be designed to move up this ladder 
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incrementally. Designing an ERL6 study that is built on a shaky ERL1 foundation will be 
of little use. Moving up requires investment, thought, and, most important of all, 
epistemic humility. Without a systematic and iterative research framework, we believe 
that behavioural scientists should carefully consider whether well-intentioned advice 
may do more harm than good.
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Figure 1. NASA Technology Readiness Levels. Original figure source: 
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/engineering/technology/txt_accordion1.html
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Figure 2. Proposed Social and Behavioural Sciences Evidence Readiness Levels
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